

HUGH GAITSKELL, M.P. on: CENTRAL AFRICAN POLICY

One Man One Vote

'... the only ultimate principle which is possible in the political field is that in these territories eventually the Constitutions and the Governments based upon them must rest upon the foundation of *one man one vote*.'

Political Advance

'We say that, as a consequence of this, we believe that the Constitution should ensure a majority of elected Africans in the Nyasaland Legislative Council and the appointment of African Ministers equal at least in number to those of other races. We say that in Northern Rhodesia there should at any rate be parity of representation between African and other races in both the Legislative and Executive Councils. These we hold to be the immediate minimum steps necessary if African opinion is to have any confidence in our ultimate intentions... we say that political advancement in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia must come first before holding the conference.'

Principles of Policy

'First, once more, the British Government—and this will not be difficult for them, I know—must reaffirm their strict adherence to the words of the Preamble in the Constitution. *Secondly*, in consequence of this, there must not be any change in the powers of either the Federal Government or of the territorial Governments as against this United Kingdom Parliament unless and until there are proper democratic constitutions and franchises established in these territories. *Thirdly*, we should make it plain that any idea of Dominion status as a result of the 1960 Conference must be excluded.'

'But we should make it plain that the agenda of the conference will not be so circumscribed as to rule out discussion of the continuance of federation itself... for if we accept that consent must be the basis, for my part I cannot see how, ultimately, the right of secession can be denied. But I believe that if this right is conceded it is far less likely to take place.'

'I believe that the key to success here is the establishment of African confidence in the rights of the African peoples to ultimate democratic independence and self-government, and that the way to achieve that confidence is to bring about practical and immediate political reforms.'

—House of Commons, July 22nd, 1959.

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MORALITY IN CENTRAL AFRICA

LAST June I visited Dr. Hastings Banda, Mr. Chipembere and Mr. Chisiza in the white-washed courtyard of Gwelo Prison in Southern Rhodesia. A few days later I talked with Kenneth Kaunda in the prison office of Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia. He was just recovering from the damage caused to his health by his rustication to a remote tribal area. A few days later still and I was visiting Zomba Prison, Nyasaland, to meet Mrs. Rose Chibambo, who sat and talked to me across a table, meanwhile nursing her tiny child. In each case the first question asked me was, 'Is Labour going to win the election?'

Not for more than half a century has a colonial issue played a vital part in a British general election. There are still people who can be heard to say that the Labour Movement should not concern itself with such issues at election time. Yet we have a Government which has torn to shreds the British reputation for international morality over Suez; stirred up hatred in Cyprus and then stubbornly pursued a policy of violence until rescued by other nations; publicly defended those responsible for beating eleven prisoners to death in Kenya; and now cynically led its lobby sheep to reject a judicial condemnation of its own Central African policy pronounced by a commission which it set up itself. If politics is no longer concerned with the morality of government it has surely lost all meaning.

There are seven million people living in Central Africa. Of them, 6,700,000 are bitterly opposed to the policy followed by British Governments over the past six years. Nearly five million of these are under the protection of the British Crown at the voluntary request of their forebears. They believed that the British people could be trusted with the responsibility for their affairs until they had gained the knowledge to handle them for themselves. They never dreamt that British protection could mean the imposition against their will of an alien form of government or handing them over to the rule of a handful of white immigrant aristocrats.

The inevitable result of this policy has been a vicious dragooning of the black masses into a state of subjection to white domination. It could only be achieved by a policy of force, culminating in the creation of what the Government's own Commission describes as 'a police state'. What the Tories have termed 'law and order' is now exposed as the abrogation of law to establish an order without opposition. The Devlin Commission has shown by specific examples that the consequence of this policy was the use of brutality with official sanction against British protected persons for the crime of organising political protests against Government policy. The Government has been warned that its policy was heading for disaster. It appointed a commission which confirmed these warnings. Thereupon the Government repudiated its experts' report.

The Labour Party thus has thrust upon it an enormous responsibility. The reputation of British justice and political morality, together with the sincerity of democratic pretensions, depend upon the Labour Movement removing the present Government and replacing it with one determined to restore colonial policy to a foundation of principle. The Party's policy in Central Africa is simple. It is based on the unswerving belief that Government must be founded on consent and not on force, however specious the reasons given for its use. We consider that the peoples of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should steadily advance in political responsibility and be given greatly accelerated opportunities for training in administration and public affairs. *No final decision committing the future of their territories should be taken until they are able to take it for themselves.* There is nothing wrong with the principle of Federation; but it can only be successfully applied with the consent of the federating parties. This inevitably implies the right of any of the territories to secede if they so desire. It also embraces the right for them to discuss other forms of association within the present federal system. The only sane policy of to-day therefore is to take the opportunity which the independent judicial Devlin Commission has presented of recognising the mistakes of the past, releasing those detained or rusticated, and making a new start in constituting discussions with the new ideas thrown into the pool. Labour is pledged to this policy of democratic practice in place of hypocritical, cynical expediency. The honour of Britain in fulfilling its responsibilities and the practical interest of Britain in gaining a friendly, co-operative Africa are combined as the stake at issue.

JOHN HATCH

I. Partnership or Integration ?

By BERNARD CHIDZERO

THE political and economic dynamics of race differences and fears constitute the most vital issue upon which the whole course and future of Southern Africa may turn. It is not at all certain whether there is any easy solution, let alone panacea, for the race problem. Yet a solution must be found, and there are those who argue that the workable solution, if nothing more, lies either in complete separation or in complete integration: there is no middle of the road solution.

In the context of the economic and physical realities of Central Africa, and on moral and humane grounds, complete separation of the races must be ruled out as impracticable, undesirable, and disastrous were it physically possible. The different peoples of Central Africa have made the country their permanent home; they have sunk their capital, given their labour, and developed the country. They all have a rightful place and equal claim. But it is pertinent to ask whether this claim should be based on group and race considerations, or on individual equality regardless of race. In any case, once we reject separation as impracticable and undesirable, we must inquire whether in doing so we accept the alternative of integration and its full implications, or whether we think a third alternative is possible.

The Choice

Whether we choose partnership or integration, the choice must depend on the following considerations:

- (a) the rightful aspirations of the majority of the people of Central Africa, for in the end only a government with majority consent can rule without force and repression;
- (b) actual economic and political forces in Central Africa which must be accommodated; political power makes constitutions not *vice versa*;
- (c) the reforms that are necessary to create in Central Africa an harmonious society and a government responsive to national needs and interests, rather than to sectional interests; and, finally,
- (d) the workability and constructive purpose of either partnership or integration.

In 1953 when Oliver Lyttelton, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, presented the proposals on Central Africa, he launched the scheme as 'a great political conception' designed 'to build a society founded upon partnership between the races that inhabit Central Africa'. There is no doubt that many people in this country agreed with him, the Labour Party included—though it bitterly opposed the actual federal structure.

The inclusion of the doctrine of partnership in the preamble of the constitution, binding on the different governments (though such architects of the Federation as the present Lord Malvern were quick to state that it was forced on them and that partnership was not legally binding), has generally been regarded as a profession of faith and a moral pledge, maybe legal. It was hoped in liberal circles that a non-racial society would emerge. And there were even those who believed that partnership would mean the immediate removal of the colour bar and a speedy advance towards political equality and full democracy. Admittedly these were few, at least in this country, but it was this meaning that most Africans who were politically conscious gave to partnership. It will be apparent that the weakness of partnership lay from the very beginning in its vagueness. Neither Lyttelton himself nor anyone else defined the doctrine, or indicated its practical implications.

Partnership between races can mean anything or nothing. What did it mean in fact in a society of 300,000 Europeans and 7,000,000 Africans? No one cared to say. Indeed, even as recently as last April, when Lord Hume referred to partnership as connoting equality between Europeans and Africans in 'all walks of life, industrial, social and political', he came no nearer to the heart of the matter. Is it equality between Europeans and Africans as groups or as individuals? Is it political parity between racial groups or political equality of individuals? What does it in fact mean against the hard facts of 300,000 economically and politically powerful Europeans and 7,000,000 Africans chafing under all sorts of restraints and disabilities? It was difficult (and it is now impossible) for Africans not to suspect (and now reject) such a vague theory, particularly when local Europeans gave a very different interpretation to it. And history has vindicated African fears. Partnership has meant neither the dismantling of the colour bar—minor reforms and concessions notwithstanding—nor political liberalisation and democratisation. If anything, the different governments have grown more reactionary and more repressive, and reforms have been effected under African pressure and overseas criticism rather than in deliberate pursuance of the policy of partnership.

Apart from such constructive and positive measures as the establishment of a multi-racial university (whose fortunes as such are not too certain) and a non-racial civil service, most of the reforms and concessions to Africans hardly touch the heart of the matter, and no government in Central Africa can repeal the Land Apportionment Act in Southern Rhodesia or reform the electoral laws, so long as the electorates are European-dominated. Partnership cuts no ice in these matters.

* See page 11.

The grim reality which must never be lost sight of is that until the African has constitutionally-recognised political power adequate to safeguard whatever gains he makes, there is no guarantee that the present process will not be reversed or frozen. The imperatives of the European electorate are such that liberalisation can only reach a certain point.

Partnership, as 'equality for civilised people and government in civilised hands', means government on European terms and under European domination for as long as the European minority can deploy its economic power, educational superiority, and administrative know-how, while employing subtle and crude shock-absorbers—such as limited African participation in government and limited inter-racial social amenities—to accommodate the interests of a small number of Africans.

African View

On the other hand, by partnership the African and the progressive understand individual equality and a non-racial society. It is a partnership based on the concept of non-racialism. It inevitably means government by majority consent, and a majority which, though it is predominantly African because of numerical preponderance of the African, will none the less disregard racial differences. It can be argued that Britain has a majority government which is wholly white, but a government which transcends racial differences. The analogy is, of course, not wholly valid, for the problems of Central Africa are very different from those of Britain. Yet it is important to bear in mind that this is the only form of government that in the end will satisfy most Africans. The emphasis is on the individual regardless of race or colour, and the implication that the whole society must permit to individuals freedom of movement and association and participation in government.

The British people and Government must make a clear choice between these two policies. No aimless drifting will do. And of the two, it is difficult to see how any socialist or liberal, indeed any realist who is interested in building a lasting society with government by consent, can fail to reject partnership between groups. He can but embrace a policy which seeks to establish the position of the individual regardless of race, colour, class: call this latter policy integration or what you will.

The lack of intercourse between the racial groups, a product of history and the legal structure as well as convention, constitutes a most serious obstacle to mutual understanding and confidence—the foundations of unity. Inter-racial amity and the establishment of government by consent demand the dismantling of the present social and political structure. This entails a wide range of reforms, for instance:

- (a) Abolition of the colour bar as it makes itself felt in diverse daily irritations and insults, and as it affects African access to hotels, restaurants, cinemas;
- (b) Removal of race discrimination in labour regulations; the abolition of job reservation and differential wages and salaries;

- (c) Establishment, by stages, as financial, administrative and language difficulties allow, of mixed schools;
- (d) Abolition of the pass laws and restrictions on inter-territorial movement of persons;
- (e) Repeal of those arbitrary government measures which make mockery of the rule of law and which operate mainly, if not exclusively, against one section of the population, e.g. Southern Rhodesia's Inter-Territorial Movement of Persons Act, Unlawful Organisations Act, Preventive Detention Act, etc.;
- (f) Land redistribution, with reasonable protection to avoid take-over bids and speculation, once a freer system of land ownership regardless of race is effected;
- (g) Substitution of non-segregated residential areas for compulsorily segregated areas;
- (h) Widening of the electorate in order to force political parties and governments to respond to a wider range of interests and therefore not to rely on and appeal to race fears and interests.

Obviously such reforms and others require time, but it must be made clear in which direction we are going. This means that the British Government and the peoples of Central Africa must be committed to a definite policy. Once this is done, and once the two racial groups have adequate political power to make the reforms possible and to defend their rights during the transition period before full democracy, the practical difficulties should be relatively easy to overcome.

From the foregoing, it is clear that a sound policy requires a definite departure from a Rhodesian-type of society to, for instance, a Jamaican-type. A bold and imaginative policy which genuinely seeks to place the individual before the race-group and secure government by majority consent is in the end the only policy that can work in Central Africa. It is no use pandering to the present privileged position of the European; equally the African must realise that practical politics may and will require transitional measures which will be far from democratic. But if such measures and agreements result from negotiation between European and African leaders meeting as equals, and not from unilateral impositions by the European community with the tacit approval of the British Government, a *modus vivendi* can be had.

The Franchise

In all this, the question of the franchise is crucial. As long as the present high franchise qualifications obtain, the electorates are bound to be predominantly European and unrepresentative of the majority of the population and majority interests. As long as the territorial and federal electorates are narrow and predominantly European, no political party, no government, can effect any truly liberal measures. Every political party and every government must for so long remain an instrument of that narrow segment of society and at its mercy; for so long, too,

Africans will be driven to resort to unconstitutional means to make their voice heard.

Finally, it must be realised that any move in the direction of integration, liberalisation and democratisation must be accompanied by reasonable political and constitutional safeguards. These safeguards are as much necessary to protect the legitimate rights of minorities as to avoid possible inefficiency and corruption in administration and parliamentary activity, in consequence of a rapid advance of the majority. Concessions may also have to be made in response to European fears and even mere intransigence.

As to the exact nature of the safeguards, various devices are possible, ranging from constitutional entrenchments and a bill of rights, to a statutory inter-racial commission charged with the responsibility of carrying out a programme of integration and of protecting the rights of individuals and minorities. But these, too, must be the product of negotiation between Europeans and Africans through their genuine representatives. The sooner any

measures and settlement in Central Africa are negotiated freely, with the British Government acting as impartial arbiter in the cause of justice, the better.

If Europeans and Africans in Central Africa cannot agree among themselves, it seems unavoidable for political and moral considerations that the will of the majority must be made to prevail by the British Government which at the same time must protect legitimate minority rights, but not yield to minority pressure. The British Government only aggravates the situation by making private deals with the European minority (cf. the 1957 conventions) and disregarding the African majority. A fair and firm British Government, acting on principle and in response to the dictates of the historical process of African advance, can help secure a satisfactory settlement in Central Africa, not by making vague statements and ambiguous pledges, but by holding out four-square for the cause of political equality and government by majority consent regardless of the immediate cost.

DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY

DISCUSSION in this session was mainly concerned with defining the power which Britain has in Central Africa and the action which it is feasible for her to take. During the course of the morning African members stated:

(a) that Britain, and particularly the Labour Party, must make it clear to Africans where she stands.

(b) that Africans in Nyasaland had given up all hope of Britain intercepting on their behalf and so had reverted to self-help.

(c) that although Africans appreciated the stand that liberal Europeans were making in Africa, they felt there was little to be gained by aligning themselves with them.

(d) that the time for passive resistance had passed since its effectiveness depended upon the moral standards of the government at which it was directed.

The following questions were discussed:

Could Britain use her Veto on Southern Rhodesian Legislation? The case was put forward that though this power had never been used it had had a restraining effect on the legislation passed in Southern Rhodesia and had been quoted by Lord Malvern as such. General opinion was that under both parties the Commonwealth Relations Office had refused to take action, and that since this power had never been used, it had lapsed.

Could Britain use Military Force in Central Africa?

The point was made that military force had been used both in Kenya and Nyasaland, but always to support the white minority. In both these countries British policies had forced the Africans into a state of frustration and when they rebelled, their suppression was called 'the restoration of law and order'. Members of the Labour Party present made it clear that in their opinion neither party would use military force in Central Africa unless Southern Rhodesia were actually to invade the Northern territories.

Could Britain boycott Central African Goods? It was suggested that Britain, by refusing to buy Rhodesian tobacco, could seriously embarrass the Federation. General opinion was that the economy of the two countries was too closely integrated for any kind of boycott to be feasible.

Could Britain bring Pressure to bear through the Structure of Federation? It was unanimously agreed that the real power Britain had in Central Africa lay not in vetoes, threats of force or boycotts, but in the structure of the Federation itself; that since we still had the power to legislate for the Northern Territories we still had the power to bargain with Southern Rhodesia. Dr. Chidzero stated again that no safeguards and no promises were of use, that only a radical alteration in the franchise and the means to develop African self-government in the Northern territories were worth discussing. On the question of franchise an African stated that it was time the Labour Party came out firmly for universal franchise. Till now it had been too ready to accept a qualified franchise as adequate in a plural society. Another member pointed out that racial harmony had come to Jamaica, after and not before, universal franchise had been introduced.

POINTS TO NOTE:

AFRICANS are no longer satisfied with safeguards or offers of protection; they must have the political power to defend themselves.

BRTAIN, if ready to take the offensive, still has the power to force the Federation into real partnership by legislating progressively in the Northern territories.

II. Federation and the

1. By AUSTEN ALBU, M.P.

THE argument for Federation has always been first and foremost an economic one, based on increased markets, the advantages of integrating territories with complementary resources and the power of the larger unit to direct economic planning and draw investment. How far has the Federation, after seven years, justified these hopes? By conventional calculations it has done extraordinarily well. The gross national product increased by approximately 45 per cent. between 1953 and 1957; European incomes have risen by 16 per cent., African incomes by 27 per cent.

Economic Growth

The question then follows: how much of this is due to Federation? The rate of increase of the gross national product between 1946 and 1953 was at least as high as it has been since, and the increase of incomes is not so much the result of federation as the natural result of economic growth largely based on the development of the copper mines in Northern Rhodesia. Nor is there any evidence that the old arguments about markets and resources have any validity. Nothing has ever hindered the free flow of goods across the territorial boundaries, nor is any political arrangement likely to do so. The same is true of resources; the chief exchange between the territories is labour, and that was so long before Federation.

Nor is the Federation to-day less vulnerable to world market changes. Copper accounts for 52 per cent. of its export trade, tobacco for 21 per cent. The bulk of the farming, whether cash or subsistence, is for the home market. There is more justification for the claim that the Federation facilitates economic planning, though even before 1953 decisions of this kind were not taken unilaterally.

The case for the economic advantages of Federation rests primarily, however, on its power to draw investment, and the certainly the rate of investment has been phenomenal. But here again it is hard to say how much this is the result of Federation. Copper dominates the economy. It is estimated that it was responsible in 1955, directly or indirectly, for 37 per cent. of the consolidated revenues collected by the Federal and Territorial Governments combined, and overwhelmingly the largest investment in the Federation—the Kariba dam—took place almost entirely because of the demands of the Copper Companies who helped to finance it. And though companies may be encouraged by the assurance that government will remain in 'civilised hands' they will be put off by the instability caused by African opposition.

Nyasaland's Share

The Fiscal Review Commission (1957) recommended that the net proceeds of the Federal tax on income and profits and also the net proceeds of export duties be divided between the governments in the following proportions: Federation: 62 per cent.;

Southern Rhodesia: 14 per cent.; Northern Rhodesia: 18 per cent.; Nyasaland: 6 per cent., and that the allocation of external loans should be in the proportions of Federation: 61 per cent.; Southern Rhodesia: 16 per cent.; Northern Rhodesia: 17 per cent.; Nyasaland: 6 per cent.

The total net expenditure of the Loan Fund from the beginning of the Federation to 30th June, 1959, has been £261m. The amount distributed to territorial governments has been £31m. of which Nyasaland received £3.5m. Of the rest, Rhodesian Railways received £78m. and the Kariba Scheme £46m. Money from the Federal allocation which went to identifiable Nyasaland schemes was: Shire Valley Project, £274,000; Nyasaland Lake Service, £227,000; Nyasaland Railways, £7,000,000; Nyasaland Electrical Supply Co., £1,500,000. Nyasaland has therefore received approximately £10m., apart from the territorial loan and the benefits she receives from Federal activities.

Most capital developments outside the Copper Belt are taking place in the towns of Southern Rhodesia or in its transport, communications and electrical generating and distribution. In 1955, the number of manufacturing establishments in Southern Rhodesia were 721, in Northern Rhodesia 207 (largely mineral processing), and in Nyasaland 27. In the first six months of 1956, out of 596 federal companies formed in the Federation, 427 were sited in Southern Rhodesia.

African Advance

Much of the investment in Southern Rhodesia in recent years has been inflationary and was inspired by the phenomenal price of copper in 1955 and 1956. Most of this investment has gone into office building. This type of investment is both non-productive and has been attracting white building workers. The growth of white immigration has itself pushed up rents and land values in the towns. There is, however, no possibility of any level of white immigration in the foreseeable future creating a large enough white population by itself to support manufacturing industry on any large scale. Except as a commodity-producing area, therefore, the economic future of the Federation must depend on the growth of the incomes of Africans who form the overwhelming bulk of the population, and on the expansion of African markets. Both are at present held back by the refusal to allow Africans to learn skilled trades and lack of technical education. They are also held back by the European trade unions demand that Africans doing skilled work shall receive the same pay as Europeans. An increase in the African standard of living also depends on the urbanisation and education of the African population and the reorganisation of their agriculture.

These requirements for African advance have not been among the economic priorities of the Federal Government.

Central African Economy

2. By SHIRLEY WILLIAMS

THERE are three economic groups to be considered in the Federation: the European money economy, the African money economy, and the African subsistence farming economy which still embraces the majority of Africans in the protectorates.

The rapid development since Federation has occurred in the European money economy—in construction, mining and manufacturing. As these have expanded, opportunities for Africans in less-skilled work, and African wages, have both increased. This appears to be the kind of development that the Federal Government most favours, since more than two-thirds of the 1957-61 Development Plan (£121.7m.) goes to the Kariba Dam and to Rhodesia Railways.

Kariba Project

From the point of view of economic returns, Kariba power and railway development is probably most profitable. From the point of view of social returns—i.e. the proportional benefit to standards of living—development of this kind may not be the most beneficial.

Take the Kariba project as an example. In the first instance, Kariba power will supply the Copperbelt, but since the scheme provides more power than the projected needs of the Copperbelt, it is envisaged that much of the surplus will be used to develop manufacturing industry in Southern Rhodesia. The sites for Kariba transformers are in the Copperbelt and in Southern Rhodesia. There will be no direct benefit to Nyasaland from the scheme, and distances involved are so great that it is very doubtful whether power could be transmitted at a later stage from Kariba at an economic cost. From the point of view of overall development of the Federation, it is arguable that the Kafue scheme (smaller but adequate for the needs of the Copperbelt) and the Shire scheme in Nyasaland—which together would have cost less than Kariba—would have been preferable.

Social Consequences

It can, of course, be replied that major industrial development and mining development will provide jobs for emigrant Nyasa workers. This is true, but two considerations must be borne in mind. The first is the disturbing social effect of having a quarter to a third of Nyasa men of working age outside the territory; already the Nyasaland Government is trying to limit the scale of emigration. The second consideration is that work in the money economy of Nyasaland contributes far more to the national income of the territory than work outside it. In 1956, over 140,000 Nyasas were working outside the territory, while 164,258 were engaged in local money-wage employment. In 1958, some 170,000 were working outside, as against a slightly larger number inside the territory (the precise figure is not available). The remittances from emigrants came to

£1.7 millions, while the money income of Nyasas employed within the territory came to £6.1 millions. It appears then, that a job for a Nyasa in Nyasaland, despite the rather lower wages there, produces three times more income for the territory than a job outside.

Granted the population pressure in Nyasaland, there is no immediate alternative to large-scale emigration, but surely the development of the Federation should not be based on the distortion of the life of one of the three territories. What is most needed in that territory is improved transport, so that farmers can move their agricultural surpluses into the towns, development of subsistence agriculture to the point where some cash crops can be produced (fertilisers are specially needed) and the establishment of local industry. The Owen Falls scheme in Uganda has inspired quite lively growth of industry there, and there is no reason why relatively inexpensive projects could not do the same for Nyasaland. In addition there are some 400,000 acres of land suitable for irrigation in Nyasaland—under the Shire scheme, irrigation and drainage was to take place. Reclamation of land in Nyasaland, which is four times more densely populated than the two Rhodesias, would make a substantial contribution to the territory's income.

Land Use

It is perhaps worth mentioning, in this context of land use, that the Select Committee on the Development of Unimproved Land in Southern Rhodesia pointed out in its report (1957) that only 1.1 million acres of the 31.7 million acres of European-held farmland in that Colony were under crops. The Committee described this as 'deplorably low'. Since the Native Reserves in S. Rhodesia and in Nyasaland are over-populated, and since the population of the Federation is expected to double within the next twenty-five years, there is a real need for the redistribution of unworked land, on the basis of productivity per acre rather than that of productivity per man, or, for that matter, of allocations according to race.

Various figures are given for the net benefit to Nyasaland of the Federal connection, but, however this figure is made up, it is clearly not so large that it could not be found from other sources. Even if there was no financial connection between Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, and even if the development of Nyasaland did not mean the territory could itself find some of the money, it would be perfectly possible for Britain to do so. After 1960, the population of the colonial territories for which C.D. and W. funds are provided will drop from 81m. to 40m., and this means that funds can be reallocated from independent territories to the remaining colonies. Alternatively, under a Labour Government which would presumably object to the rapid cutting-off of such funds from newly independent territories, more money for public loans and grants to under-

developed territories is to be provided. Either way, the extra funds needed for Nyasaland should not prove too great a burden.

On the other hand, if nothing is done to meet the political demands of the Africans in the protectorates, the economic situation of the Federation is likely to deteriorate. After the Nyasaland troubles early this year, there was a discount on Federal stock. In his annual statement for 1959, Mr. Harry Oppenheimer, Chairman of the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, emphasised the worry that investors felt about the racial policies followed in the Union and in Central Africa.

DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY

AT the beginning of this discussion African members made clear that economic advance was only of secondary importance to the African people and that Federation had to be politically as well as economically attractive before Africans would accept it.

It was generally agreed that real economic progress could not take place without political advance for the Africans, since the expansion of industry depended upon an increase in African incomes and the expansion of the African market. This in its turn depended on an improvement in African agriculture.

The following topics were discussed:

The Economy of Nyasaland: Several members asked for more information on the Nyasaland economy—particularly on the possibility of exporting through the port of Lindi in Tanganyika, on the development of the mineral resources, communications and the absorption of Nyasaland labour within the territory. It was pointed out that an economic survey by Professor Jack was expected shortly. It was stated that the effect of Federal control of economic planning had been to regard Nyasaland as a reservoir of labour and to push the Shire hydro-electric and land reclamation scheme upon which her development depended, into the background. One member stated that Nyasaland was potentially a valuable territory; her coffee and cotton industries were expanding, and she could produce cattle and fish. If the right development was pursued and the money found she could become an African Denmark supplying the Copper Belt.

African Advancement on the Copperbelt: Some members of the Conference maintained that the only way in which the present situation with regard to African advance could be changed was by agreement between the employers and the various unions and acceptance of the principle of the rate for the job. They thought that this was the only basis on which it would be possible to eliminate industrial differences due to racial differentiation.

Other members of the Conference claimed that this was unrealistic, that present European wages were artificially high and that to take them as a basis to which all other wages in the mines must be

To conclude: can an economic structure in which the wage differential between Africans and Europeans is far, far greater than that between skilled and unskilled workers in Britain; in which it is extremely difficult for an African to get a skilled job in industry or in the cities; in parts of which large areas of land are consigned solely to the white man, regardless of the use made of it or the need that exists; and in which only a very small proportion of development expenditure is going to the economically poorest of the three territories—can such an economic structure be said to foster partnership, in any genuine meaning of the term?

adjusted would mean pricing Rhodesian copper out of the world market. It would also disrupt the whole economy of the country as wage rates in government service and industry would tend to follow them. Production in Northern Rhodesia could not support the whole population at present European standards, and it was therefore impossible to make African advance in the job dependent on the attainment of inflated earnings. European workers, through their Union, might continue to be a stumbling block to African advancement, and because of this, the appeal to the trade union principle of 'the rate for the job,' should not automatically lead to their case being supported in this country.

What Kind of Development? One member pointed out that it should be seriously considered whether our whole attitude to the development of under-developed countries was not wrong. The type of investment was extractive and the attitude imperialist. What was needed now was planned and integrated development aimed at building up the country by bringing forward the indigenous people. For this, investment in communications, public utilities and social services was required, though these did not give an immediate return. Much more use should be made by colonial countries of international funds.

POINTS TO NOTE:

ECONOMIC advance is not a substitute for political advance, and the one cannot take place without the other.

FIRST priority should be given to improving African agriculture and communications in the African areas.

NYASALAND must have a detailed development plan of her own in which the Shire Development Scheme is given first priority.

THUGHT should be given to a reconsideration of the whole attitude of colonial powers to the development of under-developed areas.

III. The Political Reality

By DINGLE FOOT, M.P.

THE one thing that the Devlin Commission Report and all unbiased observation of the Nyasaland situation make clear is the implacable hatred of Africans for Federation. Some Tories and some settlers still believe that the Africans can be brought to accept Federation as it is. This is nonsense. Some believe that if the British Government had instructed District Officers to recommend Federation there would have been no opposition. This is a myth.

African Distrust

Africans have had many reasons for distrusting Federation, but over the last few years five things have particularly influenced them:

(1) Talk by European leaders, particularly Lord Malvern in 1956 and Sir Roy Welensky in 1957, of a Boston tea party.

(2) The effect of Federation on Europeans in the Protectorates. Before 1953 it was widely accepted that Nyasaland would at some time be an African State; this attitude was so changed by Federation that in 1957 the Blantyre Club altered its rules to preclude any possibility of a non-European ever becoming a member. The chairman was then a civil servant.

(3) The circular sent out by the Nyasaland government in 1957 to European education officers. This circular instructed education officers always to favour Federation in public whatever their own personal feelings. It fell into African hands and was read out by Mr. Chipembere in the Legislative Council.

(4) The delay in announcing the new constitution. The time-table of events shows that this delay was not caused by Congress. In September and November, 1957, and in March, 1958, there were African delegations to the Governor, and in June, 1958, Congress sent a delegation to London to meet the Colonial Secretary. This delegation was given to understand that an announcement would be made in August, 1958, when the Governor returned from leave. No announcement was made. On 30th October, 1958, and on 20th January, 1959, there were further meetings with the Governor, and it became clear that there was a wide gulf between the demands of Congress and those of other groups. The Europeans were thinking of an increase from five to eight African members in the Legislative Council and of the admission of one African to the Executive Council. Congress demanded an African majority in both Councils, but let it be known that it would accept parity in the Executive. Then in February the *Nyasaland Times* ran a story saying that it was not necessary to change the Nyasaland constitution before the Constitutional Conference in 1960. This article was never denied by the Government and caused Africans to believe that they would

not be properly represented at the Conference.

(5) The impact of events in the rest of Africa. The Accra Conference and the elections in Tanganyika had an important psychological effect.

With regard to the immediate future there are two points to be considered. The Devlin Report has shown that there is now no excuse for detaining Africans in Nyasaland without trial. They should either be released or tried. The Government has stated that it will keep Congress people in jail 'for a very long time' and that they are going to clear the country of Congress. This means that there is bound to be agitation in the country for their release. Second, Africans are still not going to support Federation. Mr. W. M. Chirwa, the Nyasaland member in the Federal Parliament, has already said that he will be at least as adamant as Dr. Banda on this issue.

On 3rd March, 1959, the emergency was declared. There was a demand for a judicial and a parliamentary enquiry. The Devlin Commission was set up, but its procedure and terms of reference were different from other commissions of this kind. Proceedings were to be in secret and hostile witnesses could not be brought face to face. The terms of reference were narrow. It could only look into the disturbances and not—as with the Palestine Commission and the Watson Commission in the Gold Coast—into the underlying causes. The new Commission which has been appointed will not be able to settle anything. All it can do is to make clear what are the issues which the 1960 Conference will have to settle.

The Five Issues

There are five issues to be faced when considering the future in Central Africa:

(1) Are the Africans to be denied the right of self-determination? Everything turns on the answer to this.

(2) Are they to exercise this right (which is the right of secession) at once or after a period of years?

(3) If they are to be given this right, what alternatives are there to Federation? [At present two suggestions are being canvassed—

(a) An amalgamation of Nyasaland and Tanganyika.

(b) A loose association of Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Bechuanaland with common services on the lines of the East African High Commission.]

(4) If the right of self-determination is to be withheld, should the Federation move at once or in the near future to full Dominion status? Is the Federal Government to be allowed to take over the territorial police force as it has requested? [The danger is that a Conservative government, though not granting

Dominion status, will in fact hand over effective power in 1960.]

(5) If this happens, how can the United Kingdom government either discharge or dispose of its responsibilities in the protectorates? [Sir Roy Welensky's first suggestion was that a treaty should be signed between the United Kingdom and the Federal Governments whereby the Federal Government should undertake to carry out the U.K. government's responsibilities in the Northern territories. Now he seems to favour handing over the powers of protection to the territorial governments. This is ridiculous.]

If (4) and (5) are accepted, a juridical point arises. Is a colonial power entitled to hand over its obligations? In 1955 the Chiefs of the Somaliland Protectorate brought a petition to the United Nations, when the British Government planned to turn the Haud territory over to Ethiopia. They claimed that as they were a protected territory the protecting power had no power to transfer. The British Government is in the position of a trustee and a trustee

is not entitled to hand trust property to a stranger. If the trustee wishes to divest himself of his powers, these must devolve on the beneficiary.

Finally, since the British Government voluntarily signed Article 73 of the United Nations Charter, its position has been radically altered. In that article the obligations of colonial powers are made specific.

They are—

'to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses.'

'to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions.'

The question therefore arises whether the colonial power can transfer its responsibilities to anyone else, especially to people who are not likely to fulfil these responsibilities. No one could suggest that the imposition of Federation is taking 'due account of the political aspirations of the people.'

DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY

THIS discussion led directly on from Session I, and was primarily concerned with hammering out a policy which—taking account of the powers Britain still had and could reasonably use—*might* win African support and maintain the Federation.

In answer to questions Mr. Dingle Foot made the following points:

(1) That Britain was still the sovereign power in Central Africa and had the right under Article 29 of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Constitution) Order in Council 1953, to repeal the Federation Act by an Order in Council.

(2) That Nyasaland is governed under a treaty of *cession* not of *protection* as was the case with the Northern States of Ghana.

(3) That Britain is not legally bound (or the Labour Party morally bound) by the 1957 Convention made with Sir Roy Welensky.

(4) That no one should be deceived by the Conservative Party's promise not to confer Dominion status in 1960. If control of the army, the police and the civil service is handed to the Federal Government, then effective power has been transferred.

(5) That a federation was formed by a contract between the countries concerned and the central government, and that this contract could be weighted so that essential power was retained either by the central or the territorial governments.

All members of the Conference were agreed on two things, first that Britain still had the power to shape the future of the Federation and second that no policy was acceptable unless it was negotiated with African leaders and had the consent of the African people. It was suggested that since Britain had the power to break up the Federation, any reforms she chose to make in the Northern Terri-

ories should be presented as the price the Europeans in Central Africa had to pay for the advantages of Federation. Either they accepted them or the Federation was dismembered.

Several members thought that Nyasaland ought to be allowed to secede immediately, but the general sense of the conference was that Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia must be treated together and that it was tactically better to force Southern Rhodesia to secede and leave the two Northern territories together, than to allow Nyasaland to withdraw.

African members made it clear, however, that unless the right to secede was admitted, no policy would have African consent. It was then suggested that the right to secede should be admitted, but the power to do so withheld for a period of five years. This would in effect be an ultimatum to the Federal Government that if in five years the Africans of the Northern territories were not convinced of the advantages of the Federation then they would have the power to leave it.

It was then pointed out:

(a) That such a policy would have to be agreed by both Government and Opposition in this country, otherwise it would have no validity.

(b) That Africans no longer trusted pledges and safeguards given by Britain.

(c) That the delayed right to secede would only be acceptable if it went hand in hand with sweeping changes in the franchise, and self-government in the Northern territories.

(d) That self-government must be defined as government by an African majority.

Discussion then turned on whether the changes in the franchise should be made at federal or at territorial level. It was unanimously agreed that

the first changes would have to be in the territorial franchise in the Northern territories as it was only here that Britain had the undisputed right to legislate.

African members conceded that the delayed right to secede might be acceptable if they were at the same time given real political power with which to safeguard their position.

One member then stated that it would have to be faced that if the concessions did not after all win African approval, or if the opposition refused to endorse the delayed right to secede, then the idea of federation would either have to be abandoned—or imposed by force. Another member warned that to delay the final decision about federation or to admit the possibility of a break-up in five years would have an extremely adverse effect upon investment and economic development.

Other subjects discussed were:

(a) **Transfer of Power to Federal Government:** One member stated that even where specific power had not been transferred, the hand of the Federal Government was heavy and instanced the 1957 Convention with Sir Roy Welensky and the fate of the African Affairs Board. It was generally felt that there should be some reconsideration of the powers already transferred particularly the right to control immigration and to direct economic planning.

(b) **Closer Association:** Several members thought that more research should be done into the possibilities of a Central African High Commission or some kind of Council for common services which would allow economic co-operation while giving political autonomy. If the Federation did have to be dismembered some co-ordination of services would still be necessary.

(c) **The 1960 Conference:** Several members were of the opinion that this should be delayed till 1961 in order that governments properly representative of the African peoples could be elected in the Northern territories.

POINTS TO NOTE :

WHATEVER policy is decided on must have the consent of the African people and be negotiated with their leaders.

THE CONFIDENCE of the Africans can only be regained on two conditions :

(a) That Africans are immediately given real power in the Northern territories.

(b) that the right to secede is admitted.

IF THESE conditions are fulfilled African leaders may agree to delay the right of secession for five years.

IF THESE conditions are not acceptable to the Africans, then consideration must be given again to the possibilities of Closer Association on the lines of the East African High Commission.

ABOUT THIS ISSUE

In view of the seriousness of the situation in Central Africa and the need for a definition of socialist attitudes, we have devoted the whole of this issue to statements of policy from Hugh Gaitskell, James Callaghan and John Hatch and to a report of the Conference on Central Africa which the Bureau held in Church House on Saturday, July 18th.

The aim of the Conference was to hammer out a policy for Central Africa which was feasible and at the same time might be acceptable to African leaders. Forty-two people attended including Labour M.P.s, academics, journalists and Europeans and Africans from East and Central Africa.

The Fabian Commonwealth Bureau is not, under its constitution, able to pass resolutions, but the points summarised at the end of the three sessions indicate a very real measure of agreement reached by those present.

We should like to thank all those who took part, particularly Dr. Chidzero, Austen Albu, M.P., Mrs. Shirley Williams and Dingle Foot, M.P., who gave papers, and the chairmen—Arthur Creech-Jones, M.P., Lord Faringdon and Dr. Rita Hinden.

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JAMES CALLAGHAN M.P. on :

THE DEVLIN REPORT

Government by Violence

'One by one measures were taken which screwed down the safety valve. There was no reform of the constitution. There was subtle pressure on the chiefs and on Europeans who did not seem inclined to conform on the matter of Federation. Is it remarkable that people who feel as deeply and passionately as the Nyasas do in their desire to be left alone should in these circumstances consider turning to violence? We must look at the causes as well as the results of this. The Commission states: "They could make themselves felt only by some form of resistance, and the question was shaping itself—should resistance be active or passive?"

'The prospect of collision sooner or later was almost certain. That was the state to which the Colonial Secretary's administration had reduced that territory. As the Commission said, there was a deep and bitter division of opinion separating Government and people. What is the responsibility of Government when such a frightening gap opens up? Any Government will in these circumstances resist an attempt to turn to violence. They must do. They must either act or abdicate. That is what the Commission says. That may be the right of the Government, but rights bring duties with them; we are all well enough grounded in that. If one has a right to tell people that they must not turn to violence, one has the duty to assemble the circumstances in which reasonable men will not feel the necessity to respond to appeals to turn to violence.'

Murder Plot

'In my view, the major blunder—crime, almost—was not misleading the House of Commons but that the Colonial Secretary and the Under-Secretary, in my view—and I think it is fair to say in the Devlin Commission's view—jeopardised the lives of those Europeans living in isolated homesteads, scattered, widespread, unable to be protected, and, what is more, jeopardised the lives and homes of those Africans who were arrested the following morning, because the police who made the arrests may well have believed that there was a murder plot.'

My Proposals

'... I make three proposals to them. First, release the men at present under detention or bring them to trial. Secondly, give a simple straightforward pledge to the people of Nyasaland that they will have the opportunity to secede from the Federation or to find, as I hope that they will, some more palatable connection with the other territories. Thirdly, begin at once constitutional talks with the chiefs, with the Europeans and with the men in prison so that Africans can assume more and more responsibility for their own Government in a territory which is overwhelmingly African. Do this in time for them to be able to control their own destinies when the 1960 Federal Review comes round.'

House of Commons, July 28th, 1959.

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